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THE LIABILITY OF ALASKA
MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDERS
FOR MANDATED TREATMENT
MARSHALL L. WILDE*
This Article analyzes the liability of mental health professionals for
services rendered to patients who are ordered by a court to undergo
mental health treatment. After a brief review of relevant legal
authority, this Article examines mandated treatment under the
framework of quasi-judicial immunity and continues by discussing
the specific duties of mental health professionals to patients undergoing mandated treatment. The Article also comments on the
unique issues that arise from treatment of patients under federal
benefit programs. The Article concludes by arguing that mental
health professionals do not enjoy a blanket exemption from malpractice liability and by suggesting a cautious course of action for
such professionals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Court-ordered treatment programs for substance abuse and
mental illness have become a popular tool to achieve the goals of
the criminal justice system: to punish, rehabilitate, and deter criminal behavior. In Alaska, mental health providers serve an essential
role in determining the disposition of offenders, minors, and incompetents, and have traditionally enjoyed immunity for their du1
ties in these roles. Outside the protection of immunity, mental
Copyright © 2003 by Marshall L. Wilde. This Article is also available on the
Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/20ALRWilde.
* Major, Judge Advocate General’s Department, United States Air Force Reserve, 433rd Airlift Wing, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; L.L.M., University of
Houston Law Center, 2003; J.D., University of Oregon School of Law. 1997.
1. See, e.g., Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Alaska 1994) (granting
judicial immunity based on the essential role of court-appointed experts in aiding
judicial discretionary judgments); Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that a psychiatrist who wrongfully induced a voluntary
patient into a sexual relationship was subject to suit for his improper actions while
employed); LaLonde v. Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1989) (“Most jurisdic-
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health providers also treat individuals who have been involuntarily
2
committed or who are voluntary patients. Difficult questions arise
concerning a provider’s liability when a patient does not fit into
one of these categories. Provider liability is often an issue when
treatment is made a condition of parole, custody, or another legal
benefit, or when a patient receives mandated mental health care
3
while still living in the community.
This Article addresses a provider’s liability for treating patients ordered to undergo mental health treatment. The Article
begins with a brief review of the legal authorities for mandated
treatment and then examines mandated treatment under the
framework of quasi-judicial immunity. Next, it addresses the individual duties of a provider to a patient in mandated treatment and
concludes with a discussion of the unique issues arising from treatment of patients under federal benefit programs.
II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Alaska law provides for mandated treatment for mental health
conditions that do not rise to the level of legal insanity. Under
state criminal law, a defendant may be ordered into counseling as a
4
5
condition of a suspended imposition of sentence, probation, or pa6
role. Additionally, in a “child in need of aid” (“CINA”) case,
counseling or drug and alcohol treatment may be a mandatory
7
condition for regaining parental custody of children. Such conditions have held that common law immunity protects persons appointed by a court
to conduct a medical or psychiatric evaluation and render an opinion or provide
other expert assistance because of their integral relation to the judicial process.”).
2. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding quasi-judicial immunity based on the connection of neutral third parties to the judicial process and the “relevant policy considerations of attracting to
an overburdened judicial system the independent and impartial services and expertise upon which that system necessarily depends”); D.P. v. Wrangell Gen.
Hosp., 5 P.3d 225, 226 (Alaska 2000) (permitting an involuntarily committed
schizophrenic patient to sue a hospital for negligent care).
3. As used in this article, “provider” refers to a psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, or other medical professional exercising independent medical or
counseling discretion in the treatment of a patient.
4. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.080 (Michie 2002).
5. Id. § 12.55.100 (amended 2003).
6. Id. § 33.16.150.
7. Id. § 47.10.011; see also Sherry R. v. State Dep’t Health and Soc. Serv.,
Div. of Family & Youth Serv., 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003) (upholding the termination of parental rights in a CINA case because the mother continued to place her
children at substantial risk of harm by, inter alia, failing to comply with courtmandated substance abuse programs).
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tions not only require a provider to perform evaluative functions,
but also to recommend and implement a course of treatment.
Federal law adds additional categories of “mandated” patients. Since the federal government makes almost one-third of all
health expenditures in Alaska, considerations of federal law are
8
important. Given the large military presence in Alaska, providers
may treat pursuant to both federal and military law. Under the
9
Department of Defense Directive No. 6400.1, and those regulations specific to each branch of service, commanders may mandate
treatment for service members in cases of substantiated spousal or
10
child abuse. The military may also require treatment as a condi11
tion of parole. In addition to those treatment programs, there are
several federal agencies funded by the Department of Health and
Human Services, such as the Indian Health Service’s (“IHS”) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, that also
12
implement several forms of mandated treatment. Although IHS
does not have the judicial power to mandate treatment, many
Alaska Natives and Native Americans, who have already been required to complete substance abuse or similar programs, utilize the
13
services provided by IHS. In both of these contexts, a provider is
required to provide treatment in addition to evaluating a patient.
III. EVALUATIVE FUNCTIONS: QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
In the same way judges generally have immunity from personal liability for actions done in the course of their official duties,
judicially-appointed professionals, including mental health providers, are also protected from malpractice liability when they assist in
14
making a judicial decision. Such judicial decisions include: (1) de-

8. Inst. of Soc. and Econ. Research, The Cost of Health Care in Alaska, 53
Research Summary 1 (1992), available at http://www.isen.org/alaska.edu
/publications/formed/vsummary/ps53.pdf.
9. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 6400.1, FAMILY
ADVOCACY PROGRAM (FAP) (June 23, 1992).
10. Id. at ¶ 6.2.
11. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1325.7; Administration
of Military Correctional Facilities and Clemency and Parole Authority (July 17,
2001); Air Force Instruction 31-205, Air Force Corrections Program (Apr. 9,
2001).
12. Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 61
Fed. Reg. 30,617-02(E) (June 17, 1996).
13. Id.
14. Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Alaska 1994); see also Denardo
v. Michalski, 811 P.2d 315, 316 (Alaska 1991) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall) 335, 351 (1871)) (holding that judges in Alaska are absolutely immune un-
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terminations of criminal competency; (2) determinations of sufficient mental states for civil liability; and (3) determinations of men15
tal fitness in child custody proceedings.
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized “quasi-judicial immu16
nity” for mental health providers in Lythgoe v. Guinn. In that
case, Defendant Guinn, a psychologist who had been appointed as
a child custody investigator, was alleged to have engaged in certain
17
misconduct. The defendant investigated a dispute between Plain18
tiff Lythgoe and her ex-husband over the custody of their son.
The defendant recommended that the ex-husband receive cus19
tody. The plaintiff then sued, claiming that, inter alia, the defendant acted as an advocate for her ex-husband, thereby forfeiting
20
any immunity she might have had. Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the court held that the defendant “served as an ‘arm of the
court’” and performed a “function ‘integral to the judicial proc21
ess,’” and thus had quasi-judicial immunity for her actions as they
22
related to the case.
The court also cited several public policy considerations relevant to extending judicial immunity to those acting in a quasi23
judicial role. First, the court approved a policy issue identified in
Seibel v. Kimbal: exposure to liability may deter quasi-judicial offi24
cers from accepting court appointments. The Seibel court held in
favor of the mental health provider, recognizing that unless insulated from liability, providers would be less likely to accept judicial

less their acts are either not “judicial” or are outside their subject matter jurisdiction); David Cohen, Note, Judicial Malpractice Insurance? The Judiciary Responds
to the Loss of Absolute Judicial Immunity, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 267, 267
(1990).
15. See generally FED. R. CIV. PROC. 35 (2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.10.130 (Michie 2002); ALASKA CHILD IN NEED OF AID R. 16 (2002); ALASKA R. CIV.
PROC. 35 (2002); ALASKA R. EVID. 504 (2002).
16. 884 P.2d at 1086.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1088-89 (quoting Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173, 179 (Hawaii 1981)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1089-90.
24. Lythgoe, 884 P.2d at 1089 (citing Seibel, 631 P.2d 173, 180 (Hawaii 1981))
(finding that that there would be a chilling effect on the willingness of quasijudicial officers to accept appointments as experts if they were subject to liability
for their actions or testimony).
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appointments for mental health evaluations.25 Second, the Lythgoe
court considered whether exposure to liability would taint the ex26
pert’s exercise of discretion in his actions and testimony. The
United States Supreme Court has commented on the importance of
such discretion in determining quasi-judicial immunity: “[w]hen judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of
judges—that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judg27
ment’ as a part of their function.” Upholding this same principle,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that “[t]he sine qua non of the exercise of such discretion is the freedom to act in an objective and
28
independent manner.” Third, the court recognized that the threat
of liability may cause quasi-judicial officers to be unduly inhibited
29
in the performance of their functions.
Following Lythgoe, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in Karen
30
L. v. State that two doctors who evaluated both parties in a CINA
31
proceeding were immune from tort liability. The court held that
the selection process for the physicians was irrelevant; it did not
32
matter whether the court or the parties selected the physicians.
Rather, the question was “‘whether [the doctor’s] activity is an integral part of the judicial process so that to deny immunity would
disserve the broader public interest that non-judicial officers act
33
without fear of liability.’”
While the Alaska Supreme Court has not enumerated a clear
test for applying quasi-judicial immunity, both Lythgoe and Karen
L. appear to employ two common elements: (1) the officer must be
34
an arm of the court, “integral to the judicial process” ; and (2) the
actions of the officer must involve some degree of discretion, the

25. Id. at 1093. This is especially true given the low rates of compensation often given to providers assisting courts. Id. Concerns about compensation and liability have often been cited as a reason why physicians are reluctant to serve on
medical malpractice screening panels as well. Id.
26. Id.
27. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976)).
28. Lythgoe, 844 P.2d at 1089.
29. Id. at 1089-90.
30. 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
31. Id. at 878-79.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Lythgoe, 884 P. 2d at 1088 (quoting Lavit v. Superior Court, 839
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. App. 1992))).
34. See Karen L., 953 P.2d at 878 (ruling that such officer need not be selected
by the court).
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free exercise of which would be deterred by the threat of liability.35
However, the courts have not identified these elements as such, or
how these elements apply to continuing treatment. For example, a
court has not yet addressed the issue of which provider actions,
done in the course of implementing court-mandated treatment
36
programs, will qualify for quasi-judicial immunity. Courts have
not considered the immunity issues surrounding continuing care
beyond mere evaluation. Thus, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity protects a mental health provider when rendering an opinion necessary for adjudication, but does not necessarily protect a
provider in his continued treatment.
IV. CONTINUING TREATMENT: DUTIES OWED TO THE PATIENT
BY THE MENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER
Mental health providers have three primary duties with respect to their patients: (1) maintaining confidentiality; (2) ensuring
informed consent; and (3) maintaining professional standards of
37
care. A court mandating treatment, according to a provider’s recommendation, substantially alters a provider’s duties of confidentiality and informed consent because such a recommendation requires divulging a patient’s medical information and the mandated
38
treatment obviates the need for informed consent. Yet, the duty
of care is not altered; providers generally must give the same standard of care for patients who have been involuntarily required to
undergo treatment.
A. Confidentiality
Involuntary patients lose their right to complete confidentiality. A provider of mental health care does not owe an absolute
duty of confidentiality to such a patient because the court mandating treatment expects a report on the patient’s progress. While
Alaska generally requires confidentiality for communications to licensed professional counselors, marriage and family therapists,
psychologists and their associates, and physicians, the statutes
carve out several exceptions. These exceptions limit the scope of

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200, 08.63.200, 08.86.200, 09.55.556; ALASKA R.
EVID. 504 (Michie 2002); see also THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2001), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2498.html.
38. A provider may modify the duties of confidentiality and informed consent
when specifically authorized to do so.
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confidentiality and include provisions for mandatory and permis39
sive reporting. Furthermore, Alaska Rule of Evidence 504 carves
40
out additional exceptions for court proceedings.
1. Development of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Alaska and Federal Courts. The Alaska Supreme Court initially
41
recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege in 1976. Prior to
1976, state law provided for a physician-patient privilege in civil
proceedings, but not in criminal proceedings, and did not privilege
42
43
a patient’s communications to social workers. In Allred v. State,
the court found a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege in
criminal cases, but limited it to psychiatrists and licensed psycholo44
gists. The court stated that communications to social workers
could be privileged when they acted as psychological associates,
but were not generally subject to privilege or the duty of confiden45
tiality.
The federal courts have also considered the issue of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality. The Supreme Court interpreted
46
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to include a psychotherapist-patient

39. ALASKA STAT. § 08.29.200 applies to licensed professional counselors.
ALASKA STAT. § 08.63.200 applies to marriage and family therapists. ALASKA
STAT. § 08.86.200 applies to psychologists and their associates. ALASKA R. EVID.
504 protects statements to physicians, except in criminal trials.
40. ALASKA R. EVID. 504(d).
41. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 428 (Alaska 1976).
42. ALASKA R. CRIM. PROC. 26; ALASKA R. CIV. PROC. 43(h)(4) (rescinded
1979); Fitzgerald v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 681 (2d Cir. 1971).
43. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
44. Id. at 421-22.
45. Id. at 422 (Boochever, J., concurring) (holding that a psychological associate is an otherwise unprivileged provider acting under the supervision of a provider entitled to the privilege).
46. FED R. EVID. 501.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
Id.
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privilege.47 The Court found it persuasive that every state had
48
some form of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Court also
extended the privilege to licensed social workers, again noting that
49
the majority of the states did the same. While the dissent sharply
criticized extending the privilege to social workers, the majority
opinion cited the increasing prevalence and professional status of
50
social workers in psychotherapy as a justification. While Alaska
was not compelled to alter its rules of evidence, the Alaska Legislature responded to Jaffee by modifying the Alaska Rules of Evi51
dence to include a greater variety of professions.
2. Scope of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. Alaska law
contains both statutory and evidentiary exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In particular, Alaska law allows several
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. First, providers may divulge confidential information to other professionals in managed
care and group practice situations, provided that no identifying in52
formation about the patient is released. Second, providers may
release patient information to defend themselves from malpractice
or disciplinary actions, or when otherwise authorized to do so by
53
the patient. Third, providers are required to release patient information when reporting child abuse or abuse of the elderly and
54
disabled. Fourth, providers may warn third parties about immi55
nent threats of substantial bodily harm. Finally, providers may
disclose a patient’s medical information pursuant to the Alaska
56
Rules of Evidence.
a. Consulting Other Professionals. The Alaska Statutes
allow disclosure of patient information, with identifying informa47. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
48. Id. at 13-14.
49. Id. at 16-17.
50. Id.; see also Jennifer S. Klein, Note, “I’m Your Therapist, You Can Tell Me
Anything”: The Supreme Court Confirms the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Jaffee v. Redmond, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 701 (1998); Catharina J. H. Dubbelday, Comment, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the
Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 819 (1985).
51. See ALASKA R. EVID. 504 note to SCO 1337 (expanding the definition of
“psychotherapist” to include licensed professional counselors).
52. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200(a)(2), 08.63.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(1) (Michie
2002).
53. Id. §§ 08.29.200(a)(3)-(4), 08.63.200(a)(2)-(3), 08.86.200(a)(2),(5).
54. Id. §§ 08.29.200(b), 08.63.200(b), 08.86.200(b).
55. Id. §§ 08.29.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(3). ALASKA STAT. § 08.63.200 does not
contain this exception.
56. Id. §§ 08.29.200(a)(5), 08.63.200(a)(4), 08.86.200(a)(4).
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tion redacted, for case conferences.57 This disclosure is the least
controversial because it allows better care for the patient by allowing the provider to seek other opinions for treatment. These
provisions have never been discussed in a published appellate decision.
b. Malpractice, Claim Defense, and Waiver. The Alaska
Statutes provide for exceptions to the duty of confidentiality when
defending malpractice claims, suits regarding payment for services,
58
and when authorized by the patient. The first two aspects of the
exception are not controversial because the services rendered by
providers are of specific relevance in those cases. One minor point
of contention could involve an involuntary patient’s financial liability for services rendered, but is usually resolved by the trial
court at the time of mandating treatment, and it has not been the
subject of an appellate decision.
Waiver of confidentiality has presented a more difficult issue.
59
In Beaver v. State, Defendant Beaver made admissions during juvenile sex offender treatment that were used against him in a later
60
proceeding. The defendant alleged he was coerced into participating in the treatment and, as a result of the treatment, made in61
criminating statements to his counselor in group therapy. He argued that admitting these statements in the later proceeding
62
violated his right against self-incrimination. Rejecting this argument, the trial court held that the statements were voluntary, and
noted that the defendant had signed a contract specifically waiving
63
confidentiality. The court implicitly recognized the effectiveness
of the defendant’s waiver of the privilege through participation in
64
group therapy and explicit agreement to waive confidentiality. A
57. Id. §§ 08.29.200 (a)(2), 08.63.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(1).
58. Id. §§ 08.29.200 (a)(3)-(4), 08.63.200(a)(2)-(3), 08.86.200(a)(2),(5).
59. 933 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
60. Id. at 1179.
61. Id. at 1179-80.
62. Id. at 1180.
63. See id. at 1180, 1186. Due to the lack of confidentiality, the contract provided that Beaver was not required to reveal detailed information about past offenses. Id. Beaver agreed, but disclosed identifying details of previous sex crimes
regardless of the confidentiality waiver. Id.
64. Id. at 1181-85. The court instead focused on the privilege against selfincrimination and Beaver’s allegations of coercion to discuss specific information
about his past sex crimes. Id. An article in the Alaska Law Review later criticized
the finding, arguing it would undermine the effectiveness of prison therapy.
Christina Lewis, Note, The Exploitation of Trust: The Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in Alaska As Applied to Prison Group Therapy, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 295,
311-312 (2001).
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waiver under legal duress is still a valid waiver for the purposes of
65
later prosecution.
c. Duties to Disclose. Alaska requires mental health pro66
viders to report abuse of children, the elderly, and the disabled. In
67
Walstad v. State, Defendant Walstad confessed to a counselor that
68
he sexually abused a minor. The counselor promptly reported the
abuse as required by law, and upon investigation, the Alaska State
69
Troopers obtained sufficient independent evidence to prosecute.
At trial, the judge excluded all evidence from the counselor, finding that the communications were covered by the psychotherapist70
patient privilege. However, the judge held that the counselor’s
report was not inappropriate because the counselor’s duty to report
71
creates a “limited abrogation” of those privileges. On appeal, the
defendant claimed that the reporting requirement did not abrogate
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and thus evidence from the
72
investigation should be suppressed. Rejecting this argument, the
Alaska Court of Appeals held that the Alaska Rules of Evidence
do not preclude divulgence of privileged information in “all stages
73
of all actions, cases, and proceedings.” Thus, the counselor’s sex74
ual abuse report was beyond the scope of the privilege. Mandatory treatment reports may be privileged to the extent that the information contained therein may not be admissible in court, but
information gained from investigations triggered by such reports is
not so excluded.
d. Warning Third Parties about Imminent Threats of Substantial Bodily Harm. Another exception to the duty of confidentiality comes from the Tarasoff doctrine. The Tarasoff doctrine
arose from a California Supreme Court decision, in which the court
held that a therapist has a duty to use reasonable care when the
therapist possesses knowledge that his patient will harm a third

65. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 794 (1970).
66. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200(b), 08.63.200(b), 08.86.200(b) (Michie 2002).
67. 818 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
68. Id. at 696-97 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(a)(1), which requires practitioners of the “healing arts” to immediately report to authorities suspicions that
a child has suffered harms as a result of child abuse or neglect).
69. Id. at 697.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 698.
74. Id. at 698-700 (referencing ALASKA R. EVID. 101(b), which restricts confidentiality privileges to the realm of “actions, cases, and proceedings”).
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party.75 Alaska adopted a statutory Tarasoff provision allowing
therapists to report imminent physical threats to third parties made
during therapy, and has adopted statutes mandating reports of
abuse of the elderly or disabled, and incidents of child abuse and
76
neglect.
These statutes do not extend to reporting by physicians. How77
ever, in Chizmar v. Mackie, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that a physician may reveal certain private information in
78
particular circumstances. The court affirmed a privacy right to
certain medical information, but held that a physician could dis79
close a diagnosis of HIV to a patient’s spouse.
e. Exceptions under the Alaska Rules of Evidence. The
current version of Alaska Rule of Evidence 504 contains a general
privilege for physician-patient communications, a stronger privilege
for psychotherapist-patient communications, and several excep80
tions. Communications to physicians are generally privileged in
81
civil proceedings, but admissible in criminal proceedings. However, the Rule extends the privilege for psychotherapists to both
82
criminal proceedings and civil proceedings. “Psychotherapist” is
broadly defined, and includes physicians treating mental or emotional conditions, psychologists, marriage and family therapists,
83
and licensed professional counselors. The Rule does not waive
84
privilege for group therapy. The Rule contains several exceptions, including: (1) when the patient’s condition is an element of a
claim or defense; (2) when the services were used to further a crime
or fraud; (3) when there is an allegation of a breach of duty by the
provider; (4) proceedings for hospitalization; (5) reports required

75. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439-42 (Cal. 1976).
76. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.29.200(a)(1), 08.86.200(a)(3); see also ALASKA STAT.
§§ 08.29.200(b)(2), 08.86.200(b).
77. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
78. Id. at 208.
79. Id.
80. ALASKA R. EVID. 504.
81. Id. at 504(b), (d)(7).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 504(a)(3).
84. Id. at 504(a)(4) (including communications made to “those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or
persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment . . ., including members
of the patient’s family”).
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by statute or regulation; (6) examinations by order of a judge; and
85
(7) criminal proceedings for physician-patient communications.
Interpretation of Rule 504 has been uneven. Courts have
reached different conclusions in a variety of situations, including
circumstances involving the insanity defense, CINA cases, state86
ments to a nurse, and evaluation in prior proceedings.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived when the de87
fendant raises an insanity defense. In Post v. State, Defendant
Post claimed insanity in defense of kidnapping and assault charges,
but tried to preclude the prosecution from introducing his statements to a psychiatrist regarding other attempts to avoid responsi88
bility for criminal acts by feigning mental illness. The Alaska Supreme Court admitted all his prior statements, holding that the
express terms of Rule 504 waived the privilege when the defendant
89
claimed an insanity defense.
CINA Rule 9 limits the scope of the psychotherapist-patient
90
privilege in CINA cases. The CINA rule preserves the child’s
right to the privilege, except when waived by the child, or upon a
showing by the party seeking disclosure that the need for the re91
quested disclosure outweighs the child’s interest in confidentiality.
The Rule abrogates the privilege with regard to parents, unless the
parent can show that the need for confidentiality outweighs the
92
need for the information. In making this determination, the Rule
requires the court to consider: (1) the content and nature of the
communication; (2) the purposes of Alaska Statutes section
85. Id. at 504(d) (noting there is no exception for psychotherapist-patient
communications in a criminal proceeding). The Legislature only extended the
definition of psychotherapist to include licensed professional counselors in 1998 as
part of a larger bill reforming the legal standing of counselors. Id. at 504 note to
SCO 1337. The Legislature presumably added the section to clarify the position
of counselors and social workers in light of Allred and Jaffee. Id. at 504 cmt. Physician and Psychotherapist-patient Privilege (3).
86. Compare M.R.S. v. State, 897 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1995); Post v. State, 580
P.2d 304 (Alaska 1978); Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002);
State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). These cases discuss waiver of
privilege in the context of when the insanity defense is raised, when child protective proceedings occur, and when suicidal evaluations are made by a nurse, but
each case notes that all court ordered psychological examinations of juveniles do
not fall within the exception that these examinations are not privileged.
87. 580 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1978).
88. Id. at 306-07.
89. Id.
90. ALASKA CHILD IN NEED OF AID R. 9.
91. Id. at 9(b)(3)(B).
92. Id. at 9(b)(3)(C).
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47.05.060 and of Alaska Rule of Evidence 504; (3) other possible
ways to obtain the information; (4) the public interest and need for
disclosure; and (5) the potential injury to the patient and the pa93
tient’s psychotherapist relationship.
The CINA Rule came into effect following State v. R.H.94 In
R.H., a psychologist provided therapy to a parent pursuant to a
95
court order in a CINA proceeding. The State prosecuted R.H. for
acts relating to the CINA proceeding and sought to introduce the
96
testimony of his psychologist. Despite the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal proceedings, the State argued
that the child abuse reporting requirements of Alaska Statutes sections 47.17.010-.070 and the provisions of Alaska Rule of Evidence
97
504(d) made the therapy statements admissible. Rejecting this
argument, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that the reporting requirements did not waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege in
98
criminal cases. The court acknowledged differences in the privilege both with regard to CINA and criminal cases, and with regard
to consultations with the counselor before the CINA case and after
99
the consultation was ordered by the CINA Master. While the
case did not require the court to distinguish between admissions
made prior to the evaluation and those made during the evaluation,
the reasoning of the case demonstrates that there may be a distinction between the two settings with regard to the privilege.
Statements made to a nurse also implicate the psychotherapist100
patient privilege. In Ramsey v. State, Defendant Ramsey was ar101
rested for fatally shooting two people at his high school. While in
jail, he was interviewed by a nurse as a part of an initial screening for
102
suicide risk. During the interview, the defendant denied that he
103
was suicidal. At trial, however, he claimed that he was suicidal at
the time of the crime and therefore unable to form the requisite in104
tent for murder. However, the screening nurse testified that the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 9(b)(3)(D).
683 P.2d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 275.
56 P.3d 675 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 677, 679.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 677.

111103 WILDE.DOC

284

12/29/03 2:01 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

defendant had not been suicidal.105 On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the use of his statements to the nurse violated his psy106
The Alaska Court of Appeals
chotherapist-patient privilege.
found that he had no expectation of privacy in his statements because he did not reasonably believe that the nurse was a psycho107
therapist and that she would not re-communicate his statements.
In fact, her stated purpose was to obtain information that she would
108
pass along to a therapist, if he answered that he was suicidal.
While the case does not eliminate the privilege for nurses acting under the direction of a psychotherapist, it excludes statements made
109
during triage.
In addition to triage situations, Alaska courts have considered
a defendant’s prior psychological evaluation for admissibility. In
110
M.R.S. v. State, the State had used the statements of a defendant
juvenile in a prior court-ordered evaluation to determine his ame111
The defendant appealed, claiming that
nability to treatment.
112
In
Rule 504 prohibited admission of the evaluation’s contents.
general, Rule 504 provides that court-ordered evaluations are not
subject to privilege, given that the purpose of such an examination
113
However, the Alaska Supreme
is to report back to the court.
114
The court reaCourt found the earlier statements privileged.
soned that the interests of full disclosure, particularly in juvenile
115
cases, required maintaining the privilege for earlier proceedings.
3. Liability for Breach of Confidentiality. There are relatively
few Alaska cases involving tort liability for breach of confidentiality by a mental health provider. A significant body of literature
supports imposition of tort liability for unjustified breach of confi116
dentiality, but acceptance of the tort is not uniform. The Alaska
Supreme Court recently acknowledged, in dicta, a cause of action
for invasion of privacy based on disclosure of medical information,
105. Id. at 679.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 680.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 679-80.
110. 897 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1995).
111. Id. at 64-65.
112. Id. at 64.
113. See M.R.S. v. State, 867 P.2d 836, 842-43 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); M.R.S.,
897 P.2d at 67.
114. M.R.S., 897 P.2d at 67-68.
115. Id.
116. For further discussion see Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability of Psychotherapists for Breach of Confidentiality, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 39 (1997).
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but there have been no appellate cases upholding recovery for such
117
a tort.
Langdon v. Champion118 first addressed liability for breach of
119
confidentiality. Plaintiff Langdon alleged that Defendant Champion had caused her personal injury when she fell through a trap120
door negligently left ajar. The plaintiff provided a partial release
of her medical records to the defendant, but only allowed consulta121
The
tions with her physicians in the presence of her attorneys.
defendant requested an unlimited waiver from the trial court, including permission to discuss the case with the plaintiff’s physicians
122
outside the presence of her attorney. The trial court granted the
123
request, and the plaintiff appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court
upheld the defendant’s right to request discussions with the plaintiff’s physicians outside the presence of the plaintiff’s attorneys,
124
which the physicians could refuse. The case did not specifically
address the physician’s liability for such disclosures.
Six years later, the supreme court addressed the same issue in
125
Arnett v. Baskous. In that case, Plaintiff Arnett was convicted of
126
sexually abusing his minor daughter. During the trial, the State
served a subpoena duces tecum for the plaintiff’s confidential medi127
cal records on his physician, Defendant Dr. Baskous. The defendant complied with the subpoena and was subsequently sued by the
128
The supreme court held
plaintiff for breach of fiduciary duty.
that the defendant was not liable for releasing the medical records
pursuant to the subpoena and that the plaintiff had failed to show
that the early release of the records prejudiced his criminal ac129
Despite this holding, the court cautioned the District Attion.
torney “against seeking the release of confidential documents in a
130
manner which violates the strict terms of a subpoena.”

117. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 208 (Alaska 1995).
118. 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1372.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1374-75.
125. 856 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1993).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 790-91.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 791-92 (noting that the doctor had released Arnett’s records earlier
than the date stated in the subpoena).
130. Id. at 792.
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Langdon and Arnett set the stage for Chizmar v. Mackie.131 In
Chizmar, Plaintiff Chizmar alleged that Defendant Dr. Mackie
negligently diagnosed her with HIV and, without permission, dis132
closed this diagnosis to her husband. Although the defendant’s
disclosures were excused, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
common law action for invasion of privacy existed for disclosure of
133
medical information. The court based its decision on a New York
134
case, MacDonald v. Clinger, in which a psychiatrist had revealed
135
confidential information to a plaintiff’s spouse. Thus, physicians
owe a duty of confidentiality to their patients, and breach of that
duty is compensable in tort.
While no Alaska cases have imposed tort liability for other
mental health providers, Chizmar’s reasoning would permit a cause
of action for disclosure by other providers. Mental health providers owe a modified duty of confidentiality towards their patients.
A provider may disclose confidential information only when
authorized by law and must limit their disclosure to only those facts
authorized by law. Unauthorized disclosure can result in tort liability.
B. Informed Consent
The Alaska Statutes modify the duty of informed consent in
limited circumstances. The Alaska Supreme Court originally refused to address the “difficult and complex questions . . . regarding
the duty and scope of disclosure required by the informed consent
136
doctrine” in the tort setting. For that reason, the Alaska Legisla137
ture codified the informed consent doctrine in 1976. The Legislature addressed the specific needs of involuntary patients by carving
out narrow exceptions to the usual requirements for informed con138
sent. In general, Alaska mental health providers must obtain informed consent, and are only excused from respecting the patient’s

131. 896 P.2d 196 (Alaska 1995).
132. Id. at 198.
133. See id. at 207.
134. 84 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
135. Id. at 482.
136. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975) (holding that the father of an infant blinded after oxygen treatment failed to make out a prima facie
informed consent claim because he failed to show that he would have declined the
procedure if he had known of alternative treatment).
137. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (establishing informed consent liability and defenses to malpractice claims based on informed consent).
138. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.825 (regarding patient rights).
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right to refuse treatment when specifically authorized by statute or
court order.
1. The Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent in
Alaska. At common law, the performance of a medical procedure
without the patient’s informed consent constituted an actionable
139
battery. In enacting Alaska Statutes section 09.55.556, the Legislature recognized a cause of action for failure to obtain informed
140
consent. For a provider to be liable under the statute, a patient
must prove that she would not have consented to the treatment if
she had been informed of the common risks and reasonable alter141
natives to the treatment. Further, the statute carves out exceptions to disclosing a risk or alternative if: (1) the risk is too commonly known or too remote; (2) the patient stated that she would
undergo the procedure no matter the risks or stated that she did
not want to know the risks; (3) the circumstances made consent
impossible; or (4) the provider reasonably believed that full disclosure would have a substantially adverse effect on the patient’s con142
dition.
Alaska courts have interpreted the informed consent statute in
consideration of patient’s rights. In describing the physicianpatient relationship, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that “[a]
physician therefore undertakes, not only to treat a patient physically, but also to respond fully to a patient’s inquiry about his
treatment, i.e., to tell the patient everything that a reasonable per143
son would want to know about the treatment.” Expanding upon
144
this view, the Alaska Supreme Court held in Korman v. Mallin
that, unlike in a medical malpractice case, expert testimony regarding standards of disclosure is not required in an informed con145
sent case. Informed consent cases focus on the “reasonable patient” rule, which measures the required scope of disclosure “by
what a reasonable patient would need to know in order to make an
146
informed and intelligent decision.” Therefore, expert testimony
regarding the standards of disclosure in the professional community is not necessary to resolve whether the “reasonable patient”

139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18-20 (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
140. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556.
141. Id. § 09.55.556(a).
142. Id. § 09.55.556(b).
143. Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 909 (Alaska 1991).
144. 858 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1993).
145. Id. at 1149.
146. Id.

AL.,
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rule has been satisfied.147 Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held
148
in Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group that a clear case of
failure to obtain informed consent constitutes a battery regardless
149
of proof of damages. In Trombley, the court held that the physician’s decision to harvest a vein from the plaintiff’s right leg, despite her stated preference for harvesting from the left leg, could be
150
actionable in the absence of a later consent to using the right leg.
Regulations may further add to the requirement of informed
151
consent. In Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, Plaintiff-parents alleged that Defendant-physicians failed to obtain their informed
152
consent before circumcising their son. The child later developed
a systemic infection and brain damage, allegedly from an infection
153
of the circumcision site. Alaska Administrative Code Chapter 7,
Section 12.120(c) requires that a written informed consent be in154
cluded in the patient’s medical records before surgery. The hos155
The trial court agreed
pital lost the patient’s medical records.
with the defendants that the Administrative Code regulation was
obscure and unknown, and therefore could not be used as the basis
156
The Alaska Supreme Court reof a negligence per se claim.
versed, holding that while the trial court’s conclusion could be correct, the court needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to establish
whether the regulation was obscure and unknown, or “whether it
157
could be fairly interpreted to set the standard of care.” In sum,
the supreme court has consistently held health providers to the
statutory requirement of informed consent.
2. Application of Informed Consent in Involuntary Treatment.
The law provides the patient with a strong right to refuse treatment. Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote, “[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
158
done with his own body.” The United States Supreme Court has
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916, 924 (Alaska
2000).
150. See id. at 924.
151. 895 P.2d 484, 486-87 (Alaska 1995).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 489.
154. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 12.120 (c)(2002).
155. Sweet, 895 P.2d at 487.
156. Id. at 493-94.
157. Id. at 494.
158. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). Judge
Cardozo wrote this opinion when he was a New York appellate court judge.
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recognized that a competent person has a liberty interest under the
159
Due Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Explicit in these cases is that the patient must be of sound mind.
However, mandated treatment encompasses both competent and
incompetent patients.
Generally, Alaska law protects the right of the competent patient to refuse consent as well as the right of the incompetent patient to have treatment decisions made by a court or attorney-in160
fact. The general patient rights statute contains several protec161
tions. First, it allows the patient, patient’s counsel, guardian, previous provider, representative, attorney-in-fact, and responsible
adult otherwise appointed to participate in decisions regarding the
patient’s treatment to the maximum extent possible and forbids the
162
Secwithholding of information regarding the patient’s status.
ond, the statute allows any patient capable of giving informed consent to refuse such consent, except in a narrowly defined emer163
Third, the statute requires the following: (1) the “least
gency.
restrictive” restraint available be used in protecting a patient; (2)
the patient or representative be able to choose between medically
acceptable restraints; (3) a restrained patient be adequately observed; and (4) records regarding such restraint be kept in the pa164
tient’s medical record. The statute forbids the use of electroconvulsive therapy and aversive conditioning against the patient’s will,
even if the patient is not capable of giving consent, unless such
treatment is authorized by a court, by the patient’s attorney-in-fact,
165
or by the patient through an advance directive. Even greater restrictions are placed on psychosurgery, lobotomy, and other forms
of surgical treatment. These procedures must be authorized by the
patient, or the patient’s guardian if the patient is a minor or incapable of giving informed consent, or by a court after a hearing

159. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (holding
that the right of a competent person to refuse medical care is inferred from prior
Supreme Court decisions).
160. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.825(b) (Michie 2002).
161. Id. § 47.30.825.
162. Id. § 47.30.825(b).
163. Id. § 47.30.825. The statute does allow surgical treatment in an emergency
that does not permit enough time to obtain the consent of the “proper relatives”
or court. However, it requires a written opinion by the patient’s attending physician, the consent of the “professional person in charge,” and prohibits such surgery if the patient’s objection to the surgery is religious and the patient is not a
minor. Id § 47.30.825(h).
164. Id. § 47.30.825(d).
165. Id. § 47.30.825(f).
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“compatible with full due process.”166 Finally, upon discharge, the
statute gives the patient the right to participate as much as practi167
cable in developing a plan for follow-up care.
Alaska Statutes section 47.30.836 specifically limits the ad168
ministration of psychotropic medications in non-emergencies. A
patient may only receive psychotropic medication if he consents, he
has executed an advance directive consenting, his attorney-in-fact
consents, or he is determined by a court to lack the capacity to give
169
informed consent. A patient is capable of giving informed con170
sent if he is competent and the consent is voluntary and informed.
In informing a patient, the mental health facility desiring to administer the medication must ensure that they give the information
necessary for informed consent in the manner most understandable
171
to the patient.
The section carefully defines “competent,” “informed,” and
172
A “competent” patient: (1) “has the capacity” to
“voluntary.”
understand the facts relevant to the treatment decision and is able
to appreciate his position “with regard to those facts;” (2) appreciates that he has a mental illness; (3) “has the capacity to participate
in treatment decisions by means of a rational thought process;” and
(4) “is able to articulate reasonable objections to using the medica173
tion.” The first part of the test ensures at least minimal mental
capacity. The third part of the test does not require a reasoned
thought process taking into account the same values as the provider, but does require an internal consistency to the patient’s decisions. The second and fourth parts ensure that the patient can at
least articulate an objective analysis of his condition, regardless of
whether he agrees with that analysis.
The statute’s definition of “informed” includes a broad range
174
This information
of information that the patient must receive.
includes diagnosis, prognosis, the proposed medication, its effects,
its interactions with other drugs and substances, a review of the patient’s medical history, alternative treatments and their risks and
benefits, and a notification that the patient has the right to refuse
166. Id. § 47.30.825(g). However, the statute does not specify which protections constitute “full due process.”
167. Id. § 47.30.825(i).
168. Id. § 47.30.836.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 47.30.837(a).
171. Id. § 47.30.837(b).
172. Id. § 47.30.837(d)(1).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 47.30.837(d)(2).
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treatment that can only be overridden by a court.175 The definition
of “voluntary” allows encouragement by the provider, but rules out
176
If the facility cannot obtain a pacoercion, force, and threats.
tient’s informed consent, then it must seek court approval to ad177
minister the medication.
A facility may administer psychotropic medication in an emergency without the patient’s consent, but the statute strictly limits
178
the definition of an emergency. A physician or registered nurse
must determine that the medication is necessary to preserve the life
179
of the patient or to prevent significant physical harm. The medication must be authorized by a physician and may only prescribe
medication for an initial period of twenty-four hours with two ex180
tensions, for a total of seventy-two hours. Once the patient has
been stabilized, the provider must discuss the incident with the patient and take the patient’s recommendations into account when
181
planning future treatment. If the emergency repeats or it appears
that it might occur repeatedly, the provider may only medicate the
182
patient against her will three times without court approval.
A facility may petition for court-ordered administration of
psychotropic medication if the patient appears incapable of giving
informed consent in a non-emergency situation, or has repeated
emergencies requiring administration of psychotropic medica183
tions. Upon request, the patient has the right to an attorney and
184
a guardian ad litem. If the court determines “by clear and convincing evidence” that the patient lacks the ability to give informed
consent, then the court may approve the proposed use of the medi185
cation for the requested period. However, the facility must ask
186
the court for any extensions beyond the approved period.
It is important to note that the statutes described above for
administration of medication are separate from the statutes re-

175. Id.
176. Id. § 47.30.837(d)(3).
177. See id. § 47.30.839.
178. See id. § 47.30.838 (suggesting that an emergency is defined as “a crisis
situation . . . that requires immediate use of medication to preserve the life of, or
prevent significant harm to, the patient or another person”).
179. Id. § 47.30.838(a)(1).
180. Id. § 47.30.838(a)(2).
181. Id. § 47.30.838(b).
182. Id. § 47.30.838 (c).
183. Id. § 47.30.839.
184. Id. § 47.30.839(c).
185. Id. § 47.30.839(g).
186. Id.
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garding involuntary admission. While involuntary admission may
become necessary and carries with it an authorization for treatment, additional determinations of fact must be made to justify an
187
Specifically, the fact finder must deinvoluntary commitment.
termine from “clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent
is mentally ill and as a result is likely to cause harm to the respon188
However, the patient
dent or others or is gravely disabled.”
rights statute applies to both involuntarily committed patients and
189
mandated outpatients. Alaska also allows continuing involuntary
190
treatment of outpatients. In practice, the sections regarding administration of psychotropic medications are most helpful in instances where the patient need not be involuntarily committed, has
been released from involuntary commitment but still needs treatment, or is already criminally committed.
Further, Alaska has regulations regarding informed consent.
The Alaska Administrative Code requires community mental
health centers receiving state funds to have a patient’s informed
consent in cases of experimental, nonstandard, or demonstration
191
treatment. Under the Alaska Administrative Code, prisoners retain the right to refuse any medication not specifically ordered by a
192
Residential psychiatric treatment centers are further encourt.
joined from medicating residents unless the medication has been
193
approved by the resident’s parent, guardian, or Indian custodian.
These regulations reinforce the general principles of informed consent set forth in the statutes.
3. Application of the Alaska Statutes in Practice. As a practical matter, a mandated patient may arrive at a therapist’s office
under a variety of circumstances. A court may have ordered out194
patient treatment, the patient may have been released from inpatient status but has continuing involuntary outpatient treatment re195
quirements, or a court may have ordered the patient to accept
196
treatment in a CINA or criminal case. As such, the need for informed consent is eliminated to the extent that the authorization

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id. § 47.30.735.
Id.
Id. § 47.30.835.
Id. § 47.30.795.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 71.205.
Id. tit. 22, § 5.122.
Id. § 50.875.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.660(b)(1).
Id. § 47.30.795.
Id. § 47.10.087.
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explicitly addresses a particular form of treatment, but is preserved
197
for other types of treatment.
In criminal, civil, or CINA situations, the provider should recognize that the court order generally does not specifically authorize
198
any treatment and the patient may still refuse to consent. If the
service is evaluative, the provider probably enjoys the benefits of
199
quasi-judicial immunity. However, if the service continues after
an evaluation or there is treatment beyond evaluation, the patient
200
must give her informed consent. Should the patient fail to consent, the provider’s role is to report the patient’s non-compliance to
201
the court, rather than to enforce the court order.
C. Care
Mental health providers generally owe the same duty of care
202
to mandated patients as voluntary patients. However, analogous
to the quasi-judicial immunity mental health providers enjoy,
Alaska Statutes section 47.30.815 prohibits criminal or civil liability
of, inter alia, “the attending staff of a public or private agency” for
initiating commitment proceedings, or for detaining or releasing a
patient in good faith and without gross negligence in civil commit203
The Statute does not provide similar immument proceedings.
nity for continuing care beyond the evaluation stage. While no applicable precedent directly applies, both case law regarding
voluntary admissions and statutory law protecting the civil rights of
those involuntarily committed support the conclusion that mental
health providers must give the same level of care to involuntary pa204
tients as voluntary ones.
1. Defining the Standard of Care. Defining a standard of care
for mental health providers regarding malpractice has presented

197. Id. §§ 47.30.755, 47.30.822.
198. Id. § 47.30.825(a).
199. Id. § 47.30.705.
200. Id. § 9.55.556.
201. Id. § 47.30.839.
202. See, e.g., Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 764 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the statutes do not differentiate between the care required for involuntarily committed children and voluntarily committed children); see also ALASKA STAT. §
47.30.835 (protecting the civil rights of psychiatric patients).
203. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.815. But see Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570,
577 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a physician not entitled to immunity under a similar
Oregon statute for acts performed in evaluating a prisoner).
204. See D.P. v. Wrangell Gen. Hosp., 5 P.3d 225, 230 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing an involuntary patient’s right to sue for negligence).
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some difficulties.205 However, several cases dealing with other is206
In Doe v. Sasues have implied the existence of such a duty.
207
maritan Counseling Center, Plaintiff Doe sought malpractice
damages after her therapist started a sexual relationship with her
208
during therapy. In deciding that the therapist’s employer could
potentially be held liable for the therapist’s conduct, the Alaska
209
Supreme Court noted that the therapist’s conduct was tortious.
210
In D.P. v. Wrangell General Hospital, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that an obvious case of hospital negligence, allowing a patient
on a psychiatric hold to leave contrary to her physician’s express
orders, did not require the otherwise necessary testimony of an ex211
Despite deciding the case on other grounds, the
pert witness.
212
court recognized the right to redress the injury. Finally, in Karen
213
L. v. State, the court found that quasi-judicial immunity applied
to Defendant-doctors appointed to do evaluations in a CINA
214
case. However, the court also addressed the plaintiff’s allegation
that the defendants treated her child in addition to evaluating him,
noting:
There is no evidence in the record to support Karen’s alternative
argument that the doctors were not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity because they “treated” C.L. The doctors provided
evaluations and recommendations to assist the CINA court in
determining the proper placement and counseling needs of C.L.;
215
they themselves did not provide therapy.

The court implied that an exception to quasi-judicial immunity for
216
treatment beyond mere evaluation exists.
2. Statutory Patient Protections. There have been no decisions involving malpractice on an involuntary psychiatric patient.
However, Alaska Statutes section 47.30.835 provides:

205. See generally Lawrence P. Hampton, Note, Malpractice in Psychotherapy:
Is There a Relevant Standard of Care? 35 CASE W. RES. 251, 253 (1985).
206. Id. at 255. See generally Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d
344 (Alaska 1990); Karen L. v. State, 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
207. 791 P.2d 344.
208. Id. at 345.
209. Id. at 348 (citing Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
210. 5 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2000).
211. Id. at 230.
212. Id.
213. 953 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1998).
214. Id. at 878.
215. Id. at 879, n.11.
216. Id.
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A person may not deny to a person who is undergoing evaluation or treatment under AS 47.30.660–47.30.915 a civil right,
including but not limited to, the right to free exercise of religion and the right to dispose of property, sue and be sued, enter
217
into contractual relationships, and vote.

Courts have not interpreted this statute, but the plain language
preserves the right of involuntary patients to sue. As a further protection, another section of the statute provides psychiatric patients
with additional rights, presumably enforceable through malpractice
218
or statutory violation claims.
3. Negligent Release as a Framework for Testing the Standard
of Care. Negligent release claims provide a useful framework for
examining psychiatric malpractice. Although not an Alaska case,
219
Perreira v. Colorado presents the typical facts for a negligent re220
lease claim. In Perreira, an involuntary patient at a mental health
center shot and killed an individual while undergoing outpatient
221
The victim’s wife sued the State for negligently releasing
care.
222
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the state
the patient.
223
(and by extension, the physician) could be liable for malpractice.
The Colorado court expressly limited its finding to involuntary patients whose physicians failed to meet the standard of care, noting,
“The task of assessing dangerousness is not viewed as being beyond the competence of individual therapists or as a matter upon
224
which therapists cannot agree.” However, this conclusion is suspect, as one classic study showed that a simple blind algorithm actually predicted parole violations and future dangerousness better
225
than prison psychiatrists.
217. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.835 (Michie 2002).
218. See generally id. §§ 47.30.825-47.30.865. These rights include, but are not
limited to the following: (1) the right of the patient, her guardian, her counsel, and
other agents to participate fully in therapy and evaluation; (2) the right to give and
withhold consent to medication in non-crisis circumstances; (3) the right to be free
from experimental treatment; (4) the right to a proper diet; and (5) the right to
privacy and personal possessions. Id.
219. 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989).
220. Id. at 1203-07.
221. Id. at 1204.
222. Id. at 1205-06.
223. Id. at 1220.
224. Id. at 1217 (citing Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 248 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 486 (1984)).
225. See generally PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL
PREDICATION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954).

111103 WILDE.DOC

296

12/29/03 2:01 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

Three Alaska cases indirectly address this issue: D.P. v.
226
227
Wrangell General Hospital, Burcina v. City of Ketchikan, and
228
Division of Corrections v. Neakok. D.P. targeted hospital liability rather than mental health liability, but presents a case in which
the plaintiff alleged injury from a failure to meet the standard of
229
mental health care. Plaintiff D.P. checked into Wrangell General
230
Hospital with delusions. The physician on duty wrote in his hospitalization order: “[S]hould stay in building, under observa231
tion/suicide precautions.” However, the plaintiff left the hospital,
and met a temporary forest worker, whom the plaintiff believed
232
Under this misperception, she had sex with him.233
was Jesus.
The plaintiff then sued the hospital, claiming they should have kept
234
The central issue was whether the plaintiff
her in the facility.
should have been required to call an expert witness regarding mal235
practice. However, the decision implicitly recognized that medi236
cal facilities owe a duty of care to psychiatric patients.
237
Burcina v. City of Ketchikan may also have implicitly recog238
nized a duty of care to involuntary psychiatric patients. Plaintiff
Burcina suffered from schizophrenia and had been convicted and
committed to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute after assaulting sev239
eral police officers during a psychotic episode. After his release,
he received treatment from Defendant Huffman, a psychiatrist
with a state contract to treat emergency psychiatric patients, and
240
other physicians. While under treatment, the plaintiff set fire to

See also Allen Kirk, The Prediction of Violent Behavior During Short-term Civil
Commitment, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 345 (1989).
226. 5 P.3d 225 (Alaska 2000).
227. 902 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
228. 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986).
229. D.P., 5 P.3d at 226.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 227.
235. Id. at 228. The court decided that she was not required to call an expert
witness, as the issue was less one of malpractice liability and more one of ordinary
negligence. Id. at 229.
236. Id. at 230.
237. 902 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995).
238. Id. at 823.
239. Id. at 818 n.1.
240. Id. at 819. Although not explicitly stated in the case, Burcina saw these
physicians as a condition of his release.
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his mental health clinic.241 For this, he was convicted of arson, al242
though he claimed he was suffering from delusions at the time.
The Alaska Supreme Court dismissed his claims against his physicians for injuries arising from the fire, citing a public policy rationale of preventing recovery for injuries suffered during the commis243
Thus,
sion of the crime for which the plaintiff was convicted.
while Burcina does not expressly recognize a cause of action for
malpractice in mandated treatment, neither does it rule it out.
244
Division of Corrections v. Neakok addressed by analogy the
duty of mental health providers. Neakok involved a parolee whom
the state released back into his community without active supervi245
246
sion. The parolee subsequently killed three people. The families of the victims sued the state, alleging a duty to protect them
from the foreseeable harms created by a parolee under those cir247
cumstances. The Alaska Supreme Court found that the state had
a duty to protect the public:
The state thus stands in a special relationship with a parolee,
both because of its increased ability to foresee the dangers the
parolee poses and because of its substantial ability to control the
parolee. Given this special relationship, it is not unreasonable to
impose a duty of care on the state to protect the victims of parol248
ees.

By analogy, Alaska mental health providers probably owe the
public a duty to protect them from the foreseeable violent acts of
inpatients released into the community. However, this analogy
should not be taken too far. Alaska courts have never directly addressed the issue, and other jurisdictions have not extended this
249
duty to outpatient care.
In the absence of a case permitting recovery for a breach of
the standard of care in the mandated mental health treatment context, it is difficult to know in which contexts the courts will impose
liability. Based on similar precedents and Alaska law, however, it
appears that Alaska would at least recognize a cause of action for
third parties injured by a negligent discharge from an inpatient setting. Alaska also appears to recognize a patient’s right to sue for
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 820-21.
244. 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986).
245. Id. at 1124.
246. Id. at 1123.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1126-27.
249. See Perreira v. Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198, 1212 (Colo. 1989) (focusing on
“committed patients”).
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malpractice, whether that patient seeks services voluntarily or receives them involuntarily, with the exception of evaluative services
performed pursuant to court order.
4. Competence and Care. Another important issue concerns
the standard of care regarding non-professional providers. In
250
Ramsey v. State, the court held that a nurse was not acting as an
agent of a mental health professional and therefore was not subject
to the same standard of confidentiality as is required of a treating
251
Further, Allred v. State252 considered the issue of
professional.
confidentiality of communications between patients and psychotherapists, and decided that the privilege covered only communica253
The privilege
tions to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists.
was further extended by statute and by the Supreme Court in Jaffee
254
v. Redmond.
Court-ordered classes in anger management, life skills, and
family violence prevention may be provided by a mental health
professional, a paraprofessional under the guidance of a mental
255
The mental health
health professional, or a non-professional.
professional must adhere to the standard of care for her profession,
256
as discussed above, but the non-professional has no duty of care
257
(unless unlawfully practicing counseling). The provision of services by a non-professional who acts under the supervision of a professional raises unique competence and duty of care issues. Under
general agency law, the principal is generally liable for the torts of
the agent:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent
and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the
care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the
third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the
258
one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such.

Thus, while the issue remains open in Alaska, it appears that the
agents of a mental health provider may be subject to the same

250. 56 P.3d 675 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); see also Catharina J.H. Dubbelday,
The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L. J. 777 (1985).
251. Ramsey, 56 P.3d at 680.
252. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
253. Id. at 411.
254. 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (extending the privilege to encompass psychotherapists).
255. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.101 (Michie 2002).
256. See supra IV(C).
257. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.101.
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958).
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standard of care required of the provider when acting under her
supervision.
Mandated treatment changes the duties of confidentiality and
informed consent owed to a mental health patient, but does not
fundamentally alter the duty of care. The Alaska Statutes acknowledge and define the differences in the duties of confidentiality and informed consent. Mental health providers should construe
these exceptions narrowly, as the express language of the statutes
provides that involuntary patients maintain those rights not specifically abrogated by statute. While no Alaska case involving liability
for a provider under these circumstances has yet reached the appellate level, providers can face liability for going beyond the scope
of the exceptions.
V. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Certain federal programs provide additional liability protection for providers of mental health services. While Medicare and
Medicaid do not provide limitations on liability or otherwise alter
the legal status of the provider and patient, providing care to military and public health service patients under an employment
agreement with the government can give the provider additional
259
However, these proprocedural protections under federal law.
tections for providers only apply to situations in which both the
provider and patient are employees of the United States and do not
extend to contractors or providers seeing patients under the aus260
pices of TRICARE, the military’s managed care entity.
The United States enjoyed sovereign immunity for torts committed by its employees and agents until 1949, when Congress
261
passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The FTCA permits the United States to be sued for tort claims in the federal
courts on the same terms as a private party could be sued, though it
requires filing an administrative claim, denying a jury trial, denying
punitive damages, and adding certain defenses unique to the gov262
ernment. Employees of the United States sued pursuant to their
official duties are excused from the case, and the United States is
substituted as the real party, provided that the employee was acting
263
within the scope of her employment.

259. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2002); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146
(1950); Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir. 1991).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 2617 (2002).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002).
262. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2673, 2675, 2676 (2002).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2002).
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Soon after Congress passed the FTCA, the Supreme Court de264
cided Feres v. United States. Feres held that no one may recover
against the United States in tort for an injury to a military mem265
ber. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the extension
of the doctrine to military medical malpractice in Persons v. United
266
States. Feres and Persons only protect the United States, and by
extension its employees, from liability, and only then for injuries to
267
military members. They do not prohibit recovery for injuries to
non-military beneficiaries of the TRICARE system, nor do they
protect non-employee providers of services to military members.
Not only are providers subject to suit from these individuals, but
the United States will not reimburse the provider for losses if the
268
provider loses the suit.
Certain contractors have successfully raised a defense to tort
claims based on the government’s involvement in the contracting
269
process. The reasoning employed by the government contractor
defense is that the government forced the contractor to make certain decisions based on the government’s specifications. Therefore,
the contractor cannot be held liable for the government’s acceptance of risk in these specifications. However, the government
contractor defense generally applies to products, not services, and
270
will probably not protect a provider from most negligence claims.
In order to claim the government contractor defense, a contractor must show the following: “(1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
271
the supplier but not to the United States.” This argument constitutes the “devil made me do it” defense, which implies that the actions of the United States are truly to blame, rather than any negligence on the part of the contractor, who merely filled the order to

264. 340 U.S. at 135.
265. Id. at 146.
266. 925 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1991).
267. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; Persons, 925 F.2d at 294.
268. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74
(1977).
269. See generally Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)
(discussing the defense employed by a supplier of military helicopters to the
United States).
270. Id. at 512.
271. Id.
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the government’s specifications.272 The plain language of the test
demonstrates its focus on goods, rather than services, and indeed
the defense has not been extended to encompass services. However, even if one were to attempt such an extension, one would find
that the government does not provide much in the way of precise
specifications in its terms for participation in the TRICARE program, but does specifically require, as all federal medical programs
do, that the care provided fall within the relevant standard of care.
As such, this defense is unlikely to be successfully applied to the
garden-variety malpractice claim premised on a lack of due care.
The government contractor defense may extend to instances in
which the government’s conduct caused the breach of duty. For instance, if a service member attempted to sue his mental health provider, who violated her confidentiality by disclosing her records to
her commander, the provider would have a potential defense on
the grounds that the government required the action under the
terms of his contract. In fact, the conditions of participation for
TRICARE specifically require that a copy of the patient’s records
be placed in his government file, probably protecting the provider
from liability for that particular disclosure. A civilian provider of
services to military personnel is therefore best advised to follow the
terms of the conditions for participation closely. In general, mental
health services providers, who are not government employees, will
not enjoy the protections of the Federal Tort Claims Act and may
be sued in state court for malpractice.
While all federal employees enjoy the protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Feres doctrine and the government contractor defense, when available, apply only to military employees
273
and contractors. Certain contractors with Public Health Service
entities may also share the protections of the Federal Tort Claims
274
Act. Congress enacted the Federally Supported Health Centers
Assistance Act in 1992 to reduce the growing costs of malpractice
insurance to private nonprofit health centers that provide health
services to medically underserved populations, under 42 U.S.C. §
275
245(b). The Act makes the government the medical malpractice
insurer for the health centers, their officers, employees, and contractors, allowing the health centers to eliminate the expense of

272. See David E. Seidelson, The Government Contractor Defense and the Negligent Contractor: The Devil Made Me Do It, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 259 (1998).
273. Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1454-55 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that these doctrines did not apply to a civilian).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 233 (2000).
275. Dedrick v. Youngblood, 200 F.3d 744, 744-45 (11th Cir. 2000).

111103 WILDE.DOC

302

12/29/03 2:01 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

private malpractice insurance.276 However, to qualify, a provider
must spend at least 32.5 hours a week working on the contract, unless he or she is an internist, pediatrician, family practitioner, or
277
obstetrician. The courts have construed this provision narrowly
278
In essence, unless the
to exclude employees of subcontractors.
provider works full time for a qualifying health center, the provider
will not enjoy the benefits of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The provision of services through a federal program does not
change the obligations of a provider to the patient. While full-time
employees and certain contractors enjoy certain additional protections through the Federal Tort Claims Act, these protections are
not available to providers simply participating in federal programs.
Providers participating in government health care funding programs should follow the conditions of participation carefully, as
they will not enjoy any protection beyond the limited disclosures
authorized by those conditions.
VI. CONCLUSION
When one asks a layman what duties a mental health provider owes to a mandated patient, common responses are “none”
and “exactly the same as any other patient.” However, neither is
true. Alaska providers of mandated mental health services neither
have a blanket exemption from their duties of confidentiality, informed consent, and care, nor do they have the identical duties to
these patients as voluntary patients.
Mandated care modifies the duties of confidentiality and informed consent, but a provider should construe these exceptions
narrowly. Providers employed by the United States may enjoy
some additional protections from liability through the Federal Tort
Claims Act and Feres doctrine, but these protections do not generally extend to private providers working under a federal contract.
The safest course of action for a provider of mandated mental
health services is to treat the mandated patient as much as possible
like a voluntary patient and to adapt the provider’s practices only
as specifically authorized by the terms of the mandate.
To avoid liability problems, providers and institutions that
routinely care for mandated patients should consider developing
policies regarding confidentiality and informed consent that follow
the requirements of Alaska law. Providers who only occasionally
see mandated patients may want to consult carefully with the refer-

276. Id. at 745.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)(5) (2000).
278. Dedrick, 200 F.3d at 746.
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ring authority to determine the scope of their mandate and any
limitations on confidentiality that may arise from the specific circumstance and discuss these with the patient in advance of treatment. Mandated care can be an important vehicle for helping
those who would otherwise not get help. However, the mental
health providers who care for mandated patients should be aware
of their modified duties towards them.

